




only	 Europeans	 and	 their	 countries,	 but	 also	 the	 superstructure	 in	 which	 they	 lived,	
namely	the	bipolar	divide,	 two	military	alliances	 facing	each	other,	and	the	 leadership	
and	 deep	 involvement	 of	 two	 extra-European	 superpowers	 that	 had	 interests	 and	
quarrels	at	the	global	level.	However,	as	this	chapter	will	highlight,	Cold	War	Europeans	
were	 capable	 of	 developing	 transcontinental	 dynamics	 that	 differed	 from	 and	
transcended	the	superpower	bipolar	relationship	and	its	ups	and	downs,	challenged	the	
bipolar	 divide,	 and	 gradually	 yet	 steadily	 promoted	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 thinking	 on	 the	
Continent,	based	on	webs	of	bilateral	and	multilateral	cooperation.	Tourism,	 it	will	be	
shown,	became	part	and	parcel	of	this	process	of	pan-European	cooperation,	as	well	as	
the	 expression—both	 East	 and	 West—of	 ideological	 and	 political	 visions	 of	





A	 few	years	ago,	discussing	 the	ever-expanding	scope	of	Cold	War	historiography,	 the	
historian	 Federico	 Romero	 made	 a	 strong	 case	 for	 “re-emphasis(ing)	 the	 place	 of	
Europe	in	the	global	Cold	War”.1	He	noticed	that	the	Cold	War’s	paradigms	and	defining	
features	 were	 conceived	 for	 application	 to	 the	 European	 theatre	 first:	 territorial	
partition;	 socioeconomic	 separation;	 alliance	 systems	 with	 vast	 military	 structures;	
intra-bloc	 institutionalized	 economic	 interdependencies;	 and	 vigorous	 ideological	




mental	 mapping	 that	 was	 characterized	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 otherness	 as	 a	 necessarily	
antagonistic	 entity.	 Europe	 first	 and	 foremost	 was	 framed	 as	 a	 space	 shaped	 by	 a	
dualistic	concept	of	us	and	them:	East	or	West,	backward	or	progressive,	dictatorial	or	
democratic,	 repressive	 or	 free—or	 vice	 versa,	 solidary	 or	 exploitative,	 moral	 or	
corrupted,	 fostering	 brotherhood	 or	 promoting	 individualism.	 That	 the	 structure,	




In	 addition	 to	 confrontation	 being	 a	 defining	 element	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 we	 must	
acknowledge	isolation	as	one	of	its	key	features.	This	is	visible	not	only	in	the	military,	
political,	 and	economic	organization	of	 the	blocs,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 regimes’	 attempts	 to	
obstruct	 possible	 contamination	 by	 the	 ideas	 of	 the	 other	 camp.	 Here	 again,	 the	
importance	of	the	European	reality—with	the	Berlin	Wall	as	perfect	epitome—is	crucial	




image	 of	 a	 Cold	War	 Europe	 in	 which	 the	 Iron	 Curtain	 was	 very	much	 present	 as	 a	
physical,	 ideological,	 and	even	psychological	barrier,	 secluding	people	 from	economic,	
social,	and	cultural	contamination	as	well	as	mere	contacts	with	the	other	side.	











and	 ideological	 bipolar	 equilibrium	 eroded,	 and	 small	 and	 medium	 powers	 enjoyed	
greater	 autonomy	 from	 the	 superpowers.4	In	 this	 context,	 studies	 of	 detente	 have	
proved	 that	 the	 latter	 had	 a	 substantially	 different	meaning	 for	 the	 superpowers	 and	
their	allies.	While	the	former	intended	detente	as	a	means	to	consolidate	bipolarity	and	
lower	the	costs	and	risks	of	superpower	confrontation,	“European	detente”	was	meant	
to	 promote	 a	 gradual	 overcoming	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 in	 Europe.	 This	 process	 of	
rapprochement	between	Western	Europe	and	the	socialist	countries	was	to	be	achieved	
through	expanding	 contacts	 and	deepening	mutual	 interdependence	between	 the	 two	






the	 Cold	War.	 Since	 the	mid-1960s,	most	Western	 European	 governments	 promoted,	
through	bilateral	 channels,	a	more	or	 less	successful	policy	of	detente	with	 the	Soviet	
Union	 and	 the	 Eastern	 European	 countries.7	By	 the	 mid-1960s	 the	 socialist	 regimes	
recognized	foreign	trade	as	an	important	factor	in	socialist	economic	development,	and	
planned	 to	 expand	 trade	 with	 the	 developed	 market	 economies.8	Consequently,	 the	
socialist	regimes	of	Europe	grew	ever	more	enmeshed	in	trade,	finance,	and	exchanges	
with	capitalist	Western	Europe.	
While	 still	 in	 place	 in	 “the	 ideological,	 security	 and	 symbolic	 spheres”,	 the	 Cold	War	
partition	 of	 the	 Continent	 was	 becoming	 less	 stringent.	 East	 and	 West	 remained	
separate	and	antagonistic	camps,	but	they	were	connected	by	multilateral	and	bilateral	
patterns	 of	 interaction.	 By	 the	mid-1970s,	 Europe	was	 criss-crossed	by	 an	 expanding	
web	 of	 exchanges	 that	 prefigured	 an	 area	 of	 pan-European	 cooperation,	 which	 was	





that	 several	 historians	 (who	mostly	 focus	on	 the	 superpowers)	 still	 label	 the	 “second	
Cold	War”.	Very	recently,	Oliver	Bange	and	Poul	Villaume	have	argued	strongly	against	
such	notion	and	pointed	to	the	continuity	and	relevance	of	a	 long	detente,	which	they	
define	 as	 “antagonistic	 cooperation”	 with	 strong	 elements	 of	 a	 “trans-bloc,	 trans-
societal,	and	trans-ideological	framework”	with	European	actors	at	its	centre.9	
Recent	 European	 Cold	War	 historiography	 is	 paying	 much-deserved	 attention	 to	 the	
role	of	neutral	countries	in	what	is	therefore	confirmed	as	a	complex	and	multifaceted	
space	 featuring	 not	 only	 East–West	 rivalry,	 but	 also	 diverse	 interactions	 and	 pan-
European	 cooperation.	 In	 addition,	 some	 historians	 have	 recently	 proved	 that	 this	
opening	 pan-European	 space	 also	 invited	 the	 action	 of	 actors	 that	 were	 previously	
insulated	 or	 passive,	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Community.	 Since	 the	 early	 1970s,	 the	
enlarged,	strengthened,	and	more	politically	active	European	Community	had	a	vested	
interest	 in	 the	 continuation	 of	 detente	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 new	European	 relations	
beyond	the	Cold	War	blocs’	antagonism.10	More	importantly,	the	European	Community	
proved	 not	 only	 willing	 but	 also	 able	 to	 significantly	 alter	 intra-European	 relations,	
cutting	many	of	the	blocs’	ties	in	the	East.11	
Recent	 historiography	 has	 therefore	 demonstrated	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 confrontation,	





Overcoming	 the	 Iron	 Curtain;	 and	 Untying	 Cold	 War	 Knots.12	Others	 have	 been	 more	
interested	 in	 giving	 prominence	 to	 the	 development	 of	multiple	 and	 diverse	 contacts	
across	 the	 Cold	War	 divide,	 as	 in	Raising	 the	 Iron	Curtain;	The	Nylon	Curtain;	Passing	
through	the	Iron	Curtain;	Gaps	in	the	Iron	Curtain;	The	Iron	Curtain	as	a	Semi-permeable	
Membrane;	and	Loopholes	in	the	Iron	Curtain.13	
Overall,	 this	 impressive	 historiographical	 production	 offers	 clear	 evidence	 that	 a	
diverse	 and	 numerous	 group	 of	 predominantly	 European	 actors	 were	 proactive	 in	





deeper	 cooperation	 across	 the	 Continent.	 This	 development	 is	 epitomized	 by	 the	
Helsinki	CSCE	and	its	ensuing	process,	which	Cold	War	historiography	now	recognizes	
as	 having	 had	 a	 key	 role	 in	 bringing	 about	 the	 fall	 of	 socialism.14	A	 burgeoning	
scholarship	 on	 the	 CSCE	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 it	 was	 of	 major	
importance	 in	most	 states’	Cold	War	policy,	has	 contributed	 to	elucidate	 the	different	
conceptions	of	détente	and	to	reveal	the	relevant	role	and	increasing	activism	in	Europe	
of	 actors	 other	 than	 the	 superpowers.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 CSCE	 negotiations	 and	 its	
Final	Act	reveals	that	the	pan-European	conference	was	a	step	towards	overcoming	the	
Cold	War	 order’s	 logics	 and	 constraints.15	In	 particular,	 it	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	
Helsinki	process	was	a	key	instrument	in	Western	European	and	neutral	states’	detente	




the	 economic	 and	 political	 life	 of	 socialist	 regimes.	 They	 have	 identified	 common	
patterns	across	the	socialist	bloc,	but	also	the	rifts	over	the	desirability	or	necessity	of	
opening	up	 to	 international	exchange.17	An	even	more	ambitious	 research	project,	 led	
by	the	same	historians,	is	now	exploring	the	changing	mindset	of	the	European	socialist	
elites	 when	 cooperating	 with	 Western	 Europe	 and	 the	 EEC,	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 a	
plurality	 of	 views	 in	 each	 country.	 The	 project	 reconstructs	 and	 assesses	 the	





The	 emphasis	 on	 improved	 East–West	 contacts	 and	 cooperation	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 the	
persisting	reality	of	Cold	War	antagonism.	Control	and	limitations	were	still	in	place	or	
put	in	place	by	socialist	regimes	to	respond	to	the	proliferation	of	contacts	through	an	




and	 activities	 of	 the	 security	 apparatuses	 since	 the	 1970s,	 which	 developed	 new	

















The	 inclusion	 of	 Basket	 III	 was	 entirely	 a	 Western	 idea	 and	 diplomatic	 victory.	 It	
endorses	the	liberal	concept	of	human	rights	and	centrality	of	the	individual,	and	hence	
reversed	 the	Soviet	 view,	 according	 to	which	detente	only	 related	 to	 relations	 among	
states.	 The	 Final	 Act	 gave	 governments	 and	 dissidents	 an	 opportunity	 to	 legitimately	
claim	the	modification	of	certain	rules	and	practices	of	socialist	regimes	towards	their	
own	citizens.	This	was	a	main	change	 in	 international	 law,	as	 it	asserted	the	 idea	that	
the	way	states	treat	their	citizens	was	now	a	matter	of	international	jurisdiction.	Indeed,	
the	 West’s	 emphasis	 on	 human	 contacts	 was	 justified	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 “people	 first”	
approach	 to	 detente,	 which	 also	 applied	 to	 proposals	 in	 the	 field	 of	 economic	
cooperation.20	It	 is	 in	relation	to	this	“human	contacts”	aspect	that	tourism	features	 in	
both	Baskets	II	and	III.		
The	 West	 wanted	 tourism	 in	 Basket	 II	 because	 of	 the	 tie-in	 with	 freedom	 of	
movement.21	The	 European	 Community	 member	 states	 presented	 a	 common	 draft	




beyond	 economic	 and	 commercial	 concerns	 into	 the	 social	 field	 and	 human	
relationships.	 There	 were	 also	 more	 economic	 rationales:	 another	 Italian	 proposal	
called	for	an	in-depth	study	of	the	statute	and	the	activities	of	travel	agencies,	while	a	
joint	Irish–Italian	proposal	asked	to	pay	more	attention	to	staggering	holidays	in	order	
to	 avoid	 excessive	 concentration	 of	 tourists	 in	 the	 summer	 season.	 Following	 careful	
consideration	at	European	Community	level,	these	proposals	were	brought	together	as	
a	 draft	 recommendation	 submitted	 to	 the	 CSCE.	 Much	 of	 the	 editorial	 work	 was	
completed	in	the	spring	of	1974.	Only	a	few	paragraphs	remained	problematic,	namely	
those	 on	 facilitating	 individual	 and	 group	 tourist	 movement	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	
obtaining	documents	and	foreign	currency	to	travel	(the	socialist	regimes’	delegations	
were	firmly	opposed	to	the	discussion	of	these	issues,	which	they	considered	a	matter	
for	 Basket	 III);	 and	 on	 the	 activities	 of	 foreign	 travel	 agencies,	 which	 the	 socialist	
countries	 did	 not	want	 to	 be	 specifically	 listed.	 Agreement	was	 finally	 reached	 in	 the	
second	 week	 of	 December	 1974,	 with	 the	 EC	 member	 states	 settling	 for	 a	 less	









Portugal,	 Spain,	 Italy,	 Yugoslavia,	 Greece,	 Turkey,	 Romania,	 and	 Bulgaria—was	
particularly	 active	 in	 the	 sub-commission	 dealing	 with	 the	 promotion	 of	 tourism,	 on	
which	their	economies	were	clearly	dependent.23	States	intended	to	increase	tourism	by	
“encouraging	 the	 exchange	 of	 information,	 including	 relevant	 laws	 and	 regulations,	
studies,	data	and	documentation	relating	to	tourism,	and	by	improving	statistics	with	a	
view	 to	 facilitating	 their	 comparability”,	 and	 by	 “facilitating	 the	 activities	 of	 foreign	
travel	 agencies	 and	 passenger	 transport	 companies	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	 international	
tourism”.	However,	the	West	could	not	get	a	provision	that	engaged	socialist	countries	
to	 allow	 private	 agencies	 to	 advertise	 and	 operate	 normally	 in	 socialist	 countries’	
territory.24	States	 also	 agreed	 to	 engage	 to	 “pursue	 their	 cooperation	 in	 the	 field	 of	
tourism	bilaterally	and	multilaterally	with	a	view	to	attaining”	specific	objectives	such	
as	 improving	 tourist	 infrastructure,	 examining	 possibilities	 of	 exchanging	 tourism	
specialists	 and	 students	 with	 a	 view	 to	 improving	 their	 qualifications;	 promoting	
conferences	 and	 symposia	 on	 the	 planning	 and	 development	 of	 tourism,	 and	
encouraging	tourism	outside	the	high	season.	They	also	pledged	to	“endeavour,	where	
possible,	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	development	 of	 tourism	does	not	 injure	 the	 environment	
and	the	artistic,	historic	and	cultural	heritage	in	their	respective	countries”.25	
The	most	difficult	negotiations	on	tourism	took	place	 in	the	highly	contentious	Basket	
III,	where	 the	 Soviet	 and	 their	 allies	were	determined	 to	 subject	 all	 provisions	 to	 the	
principles	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 non-interference	 in	 internal	 affairs.26 	For	 the	 West,	




through	 complex	 and	 arbitrary	 procedures.	 The	 authorities	 essentially	 promoted	
collective	tourism,	which	enabled	them	to	exercise	effective	control	over	the	actions	of	
tourists;	 pre-established	 programmes	 and	 itineraries	 allowed	 the	 regime	 to	 limit	
private	contacts	with	the	foreign	population	as	well	as	the	risks	of	defection.	Foreigners	
visiting	 socialist	 countries	 faced	 considerable	 restrictions	on	movement	 as	well	 as	 on	
contact,	direct	or	 indirect,	with	 local	 citizens.	Socialist	 regimes	also	had	an	 interest	 in	
limiting	 the	number	of	citizens	exposed	 to	 the	wealth	of	Western	societies.	Moreover,	
given	 the	 lack	 of	 hard	 currency	 in	 the	 socialist	 bloc,	 governments	 considered	
themselves	 justified	to	 impose	restrictions	to	their	citizens	willing	to	travel	abroad.	In	
addition,	tourists	were	only	allowed	to	carry	small	sums	of	money.	Conversely,	socialist	
regimes	maintained	abnormally	high	exchange	rates	 for	 foreigners	coming	to	visit	 the	
country,	in	order	to	exact	more	hard	currency.28	
The	 overriding	 Western	 preoccupation	 was	 to	 draw	 the	 socialist	 delegates	 into	 a	
serious	discussion	of	measures	that	would	have	practical	and	discernible	effects	on	the	
circulation	of	people	(and	information)	between	East	and	West.	The	EC	member	states	
made	 it	clear	 that	only	 if	 satisfied	with	 the	Basket	 III	provisions	would	 they	accept	 to	
move	to	the	CSCE	final	stage	and	to	hold	it	at	the	summit	level	(which	was	a	priority	for	
the	 Soviets).	 On	 the	 question	 of	 the	 freedom	 of	 movement,	 the	 West	 asked	 for	 the	
removal	 of	 impediments	 upon	 travel	 of	 Eastern	 European	 citizens	 to	 non-socialist	
countries,	 for	 example	 the	 reduction	 of	 passport	 fees,	 abolition	 of	 exit	 visas	






discussed	 at	 the	 Conference	 and	 should	 be	 solved	 bilaterally.	 They	 also	 stressed	 the	
differences	between	the	Eastern	and	Western	political	and	social	systems,	and	the	need	
for	 scrupulous	 observation	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 non-intervention	 and	 respect	 for	




contacts	and	 information,	 the	more	explicit	 the	 restrictive	 references	 in	 the	preamble	
should	be.30	
Work	on	the	preamble	and	provisions	related	to	travel	formalities	remained	deadlocked	
for	 months.31	By	 the	 end	 of	 April	 1975	 not	 a	 single	 word	 had	 been	 registered,	 and	






yet	 it	 represented	a	satisfactory	outcome.	33	With	regard	to	human	contacts,	 the	states	
made	 it	 “their	 aim	 to	 facilitate	 freer	 movement	 and	 contacts,	 individually	 and	
collectively,	 whether	 privately	 or	 officially,	 among	 persons,	 institutions	 and	
organizations	 of	 the	 participating	 states,	 and	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 solution	 of	 the	
humanitarian	 problems	 that	 arise	 in	 that	 connection”.34	The	 formulation	 was	 neatly	
Western,	as	it	explicitly	mentioned	individual	and	private	contacts	and	movements.		
Tourism	features	 in	 two	specific	 items	under	the	“human	contacts”	rubric:	 “Travel	 for	
Personal	 or	 Professional	 Reasons”,	 and	 “Improvement	 of	 Conditions	 for	 Tourism”.	
Overall,	the	provisions	tackled	administrative	hindrances	and	were	meant	to	reduce	the	
chances	 of	 a	 person	 being	 penalized	 for	 trying	 to	 travel	 abroad. 35 	The	 Western	
European	countries	only	obtained	two	provisions	of	general	 intent.	First,	participating	
states	 agreed	 to	 endeavour	 to	 lower,	 where	 necessary,	 the	 fees	 for	 visa	 and	 official	
travel	 documents;	 as	 it	 is	 plain	 to	 see,	 the	 states	 had	wide	 discretion	 in	 determining	
individual	cases.	Second,	states	declared	their	intention	to	ease	regulations	concerning	
movements	 of	 foreign	 citizens	 within	 their	 territory,	 with	 due	 regard	 to	 security	
requirements;	yet	 the	West	 could	not	gain	 free	movement	of	 foreigners	 in	one	state’s	
territory	apart	 from	 in	 identified	 security	 areas.	Probably,	 the	major	gain	 in	 this	 field	
was	 the	 specific	 clause	 on	 contacts	 and	meetings	 among	 religious	 faiths,	 institutions,	
and	 organizations,	 which	 was	 vigorously	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 Vatican	 delegation	 and	
supported	by	the	Italians.	
Despite	undeniable	limits	and	weaknesses,	Basket	III	offered	an	overall	framework	for	
intergovernmental	 cooperation	 and	 a	 series	 of	 guidelines	 to	 participating	 states	 for	




and	 to	 promote	 further	 cooperation.	 Other	 meetings	 followed	 in	 subsequent	 years,	
turning	the	CSCE	into	the	Helsinki	process.36	Of	course	the	Final	Act	did	not	bring	about	
a	massive	liberalization	of	travel.	Yet	in	the	ensuing	years	various	bilateral	agreements	





Bulgaria	 adopted	 the	 application	 of	 preferential	 exchange	 rates	 or	 tourist	 tariffs.	 In	
1977	 Bulgarian	 authorities	 also	 approved	 the	 granting	 of	 entry	 and	 transit	 visas	 on	
arrival	at	 the	borders.	 In	Poland,	a	decision	 in	1982	reduced	visa	deadlines,	extended	
the	validity	of	passports	to	3	years,	and	required	written	reasons	to	be	given	when	visa	
applications	were	refused.37	To	some	extent,	 the	Western	Europeans’	CSCE	promotion	








of	action	taken	at	 the	bilateral	 level	as	well	as	 in	domestic	policy.	Lastly,	 the	Final	Act	
emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 allowing	 the	 people	 to	 meet	 and	 know	 “the	 others”	




Not	 only	 does	 tourism	 offer	 a	 unique	 perspective	 that	 further	 elucidates	 the	
multifaceted	 phenomenon	 of	 East–West	 relations,	 it	 also	 opens	 another	window	 into	
socialist	regimes’	foreign,	economic,	and	domestic	policies.	The	chapters	in	this	volume	
address	a	variety	of	important	issues	that	open	up	new	avenues	for	research,	linking	the	
histories	 of	 tourism	 and	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 in	 meaningful	 ways.	 They	 also	 further	
encourage	 collaborative,	 cross-feeding	 efforts	 at	 research	 and	 conceptualization	 by	
historians	 working	 on	 various	 spheres	 of	 European	 and	 international	 history,	
communism,	economic,	social,	and	cultural	history.	
Individual	or	group	contacts	through	travelling	and	tourism	amount	to	a	transnational	
activity	 that	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 trace	 and	 even	 more	 difficult	 to	 interpret.	 A	 micro-
history	 perspective	 per	 se	 adds	 to	 our	 knowledge,	 but	 has	 a	 broader	 significance	 if	
connected	 with	 larger	 events	 and	 processes,	 such	 as	 Cold	 War	 relations,	 regional	
cooperation,	 and	 domestic	 revolutions.	 This	 approach	 necessarily	 requires	 a	 certain	
degree	 of	 quantification	 and	 qualification	 of	 the	 tourism	 and	 travel	 experience.	 How	
large	was	 the	 observed	phenomenon	 in	 specific	 country	 or	 countries	 under	 scrutiny?	
Were	tourists	and	travellers	a	relevant	part	of	the	population	at	the	given	time	and/or	
in	comparison	with	other	periods?	Even	more	 important	 is	 to	detect	and	appraise	the	
profile	and	background	of	tourists	and	travellers.	Was	the	activity	of	travelling	spread	
across	 the	 strata	 of	 the	 population—countrymen	 versus	 city-dwellers,	 apparatchiks	






a	 tool	 for	 improving	 relations	 between	 countries.	 Yet	 travellers	 have	 their	 own	 pre-





other	 system,	 how	 much	 was	 the	 travelling	 and	 tourist	 experience	 influential	 in	
changing	their	views	of	the	host	country?	And	did	perceptions	of	the	other	influence	the	
tourists’	 allegiance	 to	 their	 own	 system?	 For	 example,	 Western	 workers	 who	 in	 the	
1970s	felt	the	effects	of	the	economic	crisis	might	have	been	more	sensitive	to	low-price	
services	offered	in	socialist	countries.	




but	 also	 NGOs,	 activists,	 associations);	 on	 appraising	 their	 goals,	 and	 assessing	 the	
results.	This	volume	shows	that	we	may	record	cases	going	in	very	opposite	directions,	
namely	tourism	as	a	means	to	transcend	Cold	War	conflicting	views	or	travels	meant	to	
strengthen	 the	 regime’s	 self-constructed	 image	 of	 superiority	 and	 show-case	 the	






policy	 and	 its	 implementation,	 and	 the	 exploration	 of	 their	 interplay.	 Although	 there	
was	space	for	contacts	at	unofficial	 level,	the	state	apparatus	remained	the	main	actor	
responsible	 for	 encouraging	 or	 limiting	 these	 connections	 via	 regulations	 of	 various	
kinds,	 allocation	 of	 financial	 support,	 planning	 and	 building	 of	 infrastructure,	




research	 on	 bureaucracy	 and	 interest	 groups	 in	 other	 socialist	 countries	 is	 still	 scant	
and	rarely	goes	beyond	the	1960s.	A	diachronic	inquiry	into	the	actors	involved	in	the	
state	 apparatus	 dealing	with	 tourism	 and	 travelling	 and	 into	 the	 rules	 regulating	 the	
sector	 would	 evidence	 the	 impact	 of	 generational	 change	 or	 ideological	 turns,	 shed	






as	 to	 relations	 with	 fellow	 socialist	 countries).	 To	 take	 just	 one	 example,	 the	 Polish	




stands	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 Romanian	 or	 Soviet	 rules	 and	 vetting	 practices	 for	
citizens	 travelling	 abroad.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 worth	 analysing	 and	 assessing	 the	
different	 regimes’	 regulations	 and	 practices	 for	 incoming	Western	 tourists,	 as	 it	 was	
often	feared	they	would	spread	the	“germs”	of	capitalist	views,	morals,	and	mentality,	at	





saw	 their	 country’s	 place	 and	 prospects	 in	 an	 emerging	 space	 of	 trans-European	
connections	that	challenged	their	political	control	and	ideological	legitimization.	
Third,	 this	 research	 also	 sheds	 new	 light	 on	 the	 fabric	 of	 socialist	 societies,	 on	 the	
progressive	loss	of	citizens’	allegiance,	and	on	the	inherent	weaknesses	and	eventual	fall	
of	 the	 socialist	 system.	As	Péteri	 suggests,	 the	 socialist	 regimes’	 relationship	with	 the	






a	 means	 of	 judgement	 on	 oneself.41	In	 this	 respect,	 tourism	 and	 travelling	 certainly	
features	among	the	various	types	of	East–West	interactions	and	the	many	layers	of	the	
socialist	regimes’	engagement	with	the	West.	







was	not	only	 transparent	but	 it	 also	 yielded	 to	 strong	osmotic	 tendencies	 that	were	 globalizing	knowledge	
across	 the	 systemic	 divide	 about	 culture,	 goods,	 and	 services.	 These	 tendencies	 were	 not	 only	 fuelling	
consumer	 desires	 and	 expectations	 of	 living	 standards,	 but	 they	 also	 promoted	 in	 both	 directions	 the	
spreading	of	visions	of	…	civil,	political,	and	social	citizenship.42		
The	historian	Arnd	Bauerkämper	affirms	that	“Altogether,	the	history	of	Europe	is	to	be	
conceived	 as	 the	 history	 of	 continuous	 social	 and	 cultural	 exchange,	 interaction,	 and	
networking.” 43 	In	 this	 respect,	 the	 history	 of	 tourism	 and	 travel	 enhances	 our	
understanding	of	the	history	of	Cold	War	Europe	as	a	place	where	connectedness	came	
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